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liQuid challeNges:
coNtested water iN ceNtral asia
by Christine Bichsel*
InTroducTIon
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two large river systems of the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya were no longer situated within one state, 
but instead transected the borders of five newly independent 
states: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
and Turkmenistan.1 In the discourse of hydro politics, this was 
perceived as a geographical misfit between water and state 
boundaries, raising the potential for “water 
wars.”2 Water is a scarce resource that may be 
contended for by states and identity groups 
because it is essential for physical survival 
and basic for most human activities.3 Indeed, 
water plays a crucial role in all five states of 
post-Soviet Central Asia.4 The existing arid 
climate in the region limits the possibility 
for rain-fed agriculture and necessitates the 
supply of additional water.5 
Irrigation zones have been mainly 
developed along the two major rivers, the 
Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, which drain 
into the Aral Sea.6 One of the most hospi-
table areas to irrigated agriculture in Central 
Asia is the Ferghana Valley, an almond-
shaped intramontane basin surrounded by 
extensive mountain ranges.7 United as part 
of the Soviet Union until 1991, the Ferghana 
Valley is presently divided among the three 
successor states Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.8 It accounts for forty-five percent 
of the total irrigated area within the Syr 
Darya basin.9 However, water in Central Asia is not only used 
for irrigated agriculture, but also for energy production.10 
This article discusses conflicting claims to water in the Syr 
Darya basin with a specific focus on the Ferghana Valley. It traces 
the emergence of these claims back to Soviet water management 
and irrigation and explores the contentious nature of water both 
at the regional as well as sub-state level. It equally assesses 
international efforts to mitigate the potential for violence and 
degradation of the environment. This article also makes recom-
mendations in three fields. First, it stresses the continued need 
to address water conflicts and related issues in Central Asia 
not solely in the technical, but also the social, economic, and 
political contexts. Secondly, it emphasizes the links between the 
work of border commissions and water conflicts, particularly 
those in the Ferghana Valley. Thirdly, it proposes a rethinking 
of blueprint approaches to water management in Central Asia, 
and to allow for more space for alternative conceptualizations. 
The article concludes with the opinion that conflicts over water 
in Central Asia may be driven more by particular interests of 
specific domestic actors in each country than by non-cooperative 
inter-state relations.
Map 1: The Aral Sea Basin, courtesy of International Water 
Management Institute
The syr darya BasIn and The Ferghana valley
The irrigation network in Soviet Central Asia received 
particularly large financial and technological investments after 
World War II.11 This entailed not only extending and widening 
the major canals, but also expanding the irrigated area upwards 
and outwards from the plains to the foothills.12 Built in the 
1970s on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, the Toktogul reservoir 
was designed to support this expansion and provide seasonal 
and multi-year water storage in order to increase the availability 
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of water for irrigation in the Uzbek and Kazakh republics, as 
well as to regulate the distribution of water downstream in the 
Syr Darya River basin.13 As was common with reservoirs in the 
USSR, a hydroelectric plant was constructed at the same time, 
enabling the Toktogul reservoir to generate hydropower in con-
junction with its water management function.14 
The Soviet Union, like the Russian Empire before it, encour-
aged cotton production in Central Asia to satisfy the demand 
of the domestic textile industry.15 The Soviet Union therefore 
fervently pressed this water-intensive crop on the agriculturally 
and ecologically suitable lowlands of the Uzbek and Tajik repub-
lics, as well as further downstream in the Kazakh republic.16 
There, the Soviet Union developed irrigation and drainage proj-
ects primarily to increase cotton production in these lowland 
republics, which facilitated the rise in cotton production from 4.3 
million tons in 1960 to approximately 10 to 11 tons in 1990.17 
With cotton being a strategic priority, Soviet leaders designated 
the lion’s share of the Syr Darya river’s flow to cotton production 
in the lowlands.18 Conversely, Soviet planners resolved that the 
strategic priority in the Kyrgyz republic was animal husbandry 
with a focus on meat and milk products, as well as growing rain-
fed fodder.19 The energy needs of the Kyrgyz Republic were met 
by importing electricity and/or natural gas, coal, and oil for its 
thermal power plants from the downstream Central Asian and other 
Soviet republics.20 Thanks to these arrangements, the Toktogul 
reservoir, as part of a highly integrated network, became the key ele-
ment in large scale cotton growing in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 21
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the for-
merly integrated scheme of economic management collapsed.22 
Each of the five newly-independent Central Asian states was left 
to restructure the previously centralized water management sys-
tem.23 The Soviet Union left behind a highly integrated network 
of large irrigation canals and reservoirs, which was parceled out 
among its successor states.24 This sudden transition meant that 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan were now 
individually responsible for managing the Syr Darya’s water.25 
Moreover, these countries had to face the environmental con-
sequences of Soviet irrigation practices.26 During the 1970s it 
became apparent that the massive Soviet investments had not 
increased the efficiency of water use in Central Asia.27 Rather, 
infrastructure problems actually led to huge water losses and 
inappropriate irrigation practices caused excessive application 
of water to the fields.28 These problems culminated in the well-
publicized disaster of the Aral Sea, which suffered decrease 
in water levels, substantial pollution, and increased salinity as 
a result of heavy water diversion for irrigation and poor water 
management policies.29 Finally, although ample funds had been 
devoted to the construction of an irrigation infrastructure, little 
was spent on maintaining it.30 Thus, by the early 1990s when 
these countries became independent large parts of the irrigation 
networks in Central Asia were already in need of repair.31
Accordingly, independence necessitated the subsequent 
establishment of new water management organizations, at both 
a domestic and inter-state level.32 Each country established its 
own ministries and departments to supervise water resources.33 
These new, individualized ministries retained many of the Soviet 
organizational structures, yet faced drastically reduced fund-
ing.34 The resulting water management organizations suffered 
from declining salary pools, shrunken operating budgets, and 
little money for equipment.35 These difficulties, along with con-
cerns over the efficiency of water usage, prompted the new states 
to introduce cost recovery measures, and shift the ownership of 
tertiary irrigation infrastructures to local water users as a way to 
increase their rights and responsibilities.36 
The end of the centralized Soviet system of water manage-
ment also necessitated new agreements among the new Central 
Asian states to regulate the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Riv-
ers.37 The Almaty Agreement of 1992 established the Interstate 
Commission for Water Coordination (“ICWC”) as the highest 
decision-making body for all matters pertaining to the regula-
tion, efficient use, and protection of interstate watercourses 
and bodies of water in Central Asia.38 The ICWC consists of 
leading water officials from each of the five countries, who 
met several times annually to set allocations and quotas as 
well as resolve disputes.39 From this commission a number of 
additional agreements emerged, some of them pertaining to all 
Central Asia and others to specific rivers.40 On the Syr Darya 
River, annual agreements were reached in 1995 and subsequent 
years among riparian states concerning the allocation of water 
and energy.41 In 1998, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
concluded a watercourse-specific agreement on the use of the 
water and energy resources of the Syr Darya River, thus folding 
earlier annual agreements into the new Syr Darya Framework 
Agreement.42 Tajikistan joined this agreement in 1999.43 Thus, 
while the countries retained national control over crops, indus-
trial goods, and electric power generated by their use, they also 
worked with one another to manage available water resources. 44 
conTesTed lInks BeTWeen WaTer,  
energy and PolITIcal IndePendence
Neither the processes of domestic reform nor inter-state 
negotiations have been smooth or predictable as disputes over 
how to distribute shared water resources have arisen. The first 
major conflict regarding the seasonal distribution of water across 
the Ferghana Valley involves the operation of the Toktogul res-
ervoir and hydroelectric plant.45 The disintegration of the Soviet 
Union placed great stress on the existing system of inter-repub-
lican compensation for water and energy.46 The newly indepen-
dent downstream countries experienced difficulties consistently 
providing cheap gas for Kyrganstan, and ultimately raised 
prices.47 Unable to purchase enough gas to generate its thermal 
power plants, Kyrgyzstan experienced chronic electrical outages 
during the winter, and in the early 1990s began to release more 
water from the Toktogul reservoir during that season to drive its 
hydroelectric generators.48 But by providing for its own heating 
and lighting needs in winter, Kyrgyzstan reduces the quantity 
of water available to downstream Uzbekistan for irrigating its 
sector of the Ferghana Valley in the spring and summer.49 And 
since a limited quantity of water can be retained in facilities such 
as the Kairakkum reservoir, Kyrgyzstan’s release of water in the 
26 SuStainable Development law & policy
wintertime have repeatedly flooded these downstream areas.50 
Uzbekistan often complains about the damage caused by winter 
flooding, demanding that water should be released mainly in 
summer so as to prevent flooding and sustain irrigated crops.51 
A second dispute concerns the economic value of water 
provided across national borders. Since its independence, Kyr-
gyzstan has been neither willing nor able to assume the total 
financial burden of operating and maintaining the Toktogul dam 
and hydroelectric station nor willing to take actions to regulate 
the flow of water into the Naryn River and, accordingly, the flow 
into the Syr Darya.52 Kyrgyzstan therefore seeks compensation 
from the downstream countries.53 The annual cost to Kyrgyzstan 
of maintaining the Toktogul reservoir and its related infrastruc-
ture amounts to an estimated $15 to $27 million.54 Until 2002, 
however, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not contribute to the 
cost of maintaining and operating this facility.55 Rising gas 
prices and the shift to a more market-oriented economy have 
prompted Kyrgyzstan’s lawmakers to re-evaluate the value of 
water as a resource.56 They argue that the Syr Darya waters flow-
ing from Kyrgyzstan bring considerable economic benefit to the 
downstream countries via irrigated agriculture.57 Therefore, they 
seek to place a specific value or price on water and to charge 
its users for what they receive from Kyrgyzstan.58 Uzbekistan 
has, to date, been critical of this idea, questioning whether any 
country can actually own water and whether the water supply 
should be treated as an economic commodity.59 Moreover, it 
asserts that because Kyrgyzstan provides no “value added” to the 
water flowing from its territory, it is hardly justified in asking for 
financial compensation.60
A third point of contention concerns the apportionment of 
water from the Syr Darya River and the quantity to which the 
respective riparian countries are entitled. Kyrgyzstan contests 
the old Soviet inter-republican quotas, which designated the 
lion’s share of the Syr Darya’s water to Uzbekistan and Kazakh-
stan.61 With the 1992 Almaty Agreement on Water Resources, 
the new states confirmed that they would continue to observe 
the existing quotas for the time being, but did not detail the pos-
sibility of later changes.62 The Agreement assigned 51.7 percent 
of the river flow to Uzbekistan, 38.1 percent to Kazakhstan, 9.2 
percent to Tajikistan and only 1 percent to Kyrgyzstan.63 The 
Kyrgyz claim is that this arrangement effectively barred them 
from developing irrigated agriculture during the Soviet period 
and denied them the economic benefit that would have come 
from development.64 Kyrgyzstan, therefore, now seeks to correct 
what it sees as a historical injustice by claiming enough water to 
develop self-sustaining and market-based irrigated agriculture.65 
However, this runs in direct conflict with plans by Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, all of which seek to expand and mod-
ernize their own irrigated agriculture.66
At present, the outlined disagreements have resulted in 
plans to build new dams and to deal with the accompanying or 
resulting controversies. Among many smaller dam building proj-
ects in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are each attempt-
ing to resume the construction of large reservoirs designed in 
the 1960s and 1970s and partly constructed in the 1980s.67 In 
Kyrgyzstan, the two Kambar-Ata dam structures are planned 
upstream of the Toktogul reservoir on the Naryn River.68 These 
dams would allow electricity production during winter, while 
saving water in the Toktogul reservoir for downstream irriga-
tion purposes in the summer.69 Moreover, since the necessary 
grid is already in place, the hydropower complex could generate 
surplus electricity for exportation.70 However, there are doubts 
about the financial viability and environmental impacts of the 
project, one being that climate change-induced glacial melt and 
projected reduced water flow could render the structure obsolete 
within a generation.71 Kambar-Ata I and II are estimated to cost 
around $3 billion, a significant investment which Kyrgyzstan is 
unlikely to assume.72 So far, possible investors, including Rus-
sia, have been hesitant to invest.73 Questions of political stability 
aside, this may also be due to Uzbekistan’s firm opposition to the 
project, objecting, among other issues, to the increased control 
Kyrgyzstan would acquire over the Syr Darya River flow.74
The Rogun dam in Tajikistan is a similar project with com-
parable goals to regulate water usage and release of the Amu 
Darya River.75 Its original purpose was to guarantee sufficient 
water supply during water-scarce years for users in the Amu 
Darya basin, an area that suffers from a greater lack of regula-
tion than the Syr Darya River.76 The Soviets never completed 
the project due to the USSR’s collapse that delayed construc-
tion in 1992 but if completed, the large hydropower plant and 
enormous water reservoir to be situated on the Vaksh River, a 
tributary of the Amu Darya River, will provide yearly water run-
off regulation of the Amu Darya.77 This goal is aided by the fact 
that the Rogun River is not followed by a downstream reservoir, 
which would likely affect the flow of the Amu Darya directly.78 
However, the Rogun Dam has significant hurdles to overcome 
before it can become a reality as the huge financial investment 
needed to resume and complete the construction has not yet been 
secured.79 Once operational, Rogun is expected to cover as much 
as eighty percent of Tajikistan’s average energy consumption 
and even offers opportunities for exporting electricity.80 How-
ever, Uzbekistan has raised opposition toward the dam, listing 
concerns about reduced downstream water availability and dam 
safety.81 Downstream countries are particularly worried about 
water availability during the one to two decades in which the res-
ervoir would need to be filled.82 Moreover, downstream nations 
and communities stress the future risks of the dam, as Rogun is 
situated in a seismically active area near a geological fault line.83 
A potentially sudden outflow of such a large scale could have 
disastrous consequences for downstream riparian zones.84
InTer-grouP conFlIcTs over WaTer and land
Thus far, the focus of disputes over water and energy has 
been among the successor states following the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union. However, no less serious tensions over water 
can arise within states.85 With regard to conflicts over water, Eric 
Sievers, a Harvard University Russian and Eurasian scholar, 
writes that, “As the Syr Darya basin contains the Ferghana Valley, 
which is the most sensitive part of modern Central Asia in terms 
of ethnic violence, it presents a special case of conflict.”86 He 
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suggests that water scarcity and strained inter-ethnic relations 
could lead to violent conflict.87 Indeed, many water users have 
faced declining access to water and greater uncertainties over its 
delivery after independence.88 The changing seasonal patterns 
of water distribution and the effects of the inefficient and dilapi-
dated infrastructure have negatively affected the situation.89 
Moreover, as the population continues to grow, there will be a 
further increase of pressure on water, land, and other natural 
resources.90 Finally, as Sievers suggests, parts of the Ferghana 
Valley experienced a rapid social and economic decline follow-
ing independence, which, if accelerated, could spur violence 
among a population overwhelmingly dependent on irrigated 
agriculture.91
Conflicts over water distribution are a frequent occurrence 
in the irrigated sections of the Ferghana Valley.92 On the southern 
side of the valley, tensions tend to emerge in springtime when the 
beginning of the agricultural season brings a high water demand 
but the flow of the glacier-fed rivers has not yet filled irrigation 
canals to meet that demand.93 Since most of the Ferghana Val-
ley irrigation systems are gravity-operated, nearly all conflicts 
occur between upstream and downstream users.94 A more erratic 
post-independence water supply has accentuated differences in 
access to water between upstream and downstream users and has 
increased competition for water during the springtime.95 As a 
result, conflict parties form along territorial or residential affilia-
tion rather than ethnic or kinship lines, although these categories 
frequently overlap.96
Water sources are contested particularly when rivers or 
canals transect the new international borders and are thus subject 
to inter-state agreements.97 In the southern part of the Ferghana 
Valley this has entailed revising the allocation of water from 
several rivers and springs.98 For example, during the Soviet 
period sixty-nine percent of the Shakhimardan Sai River’s flow 
was allocated to the Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic SSR, as 
compared with twenty-one percent for the Kyrgyz SSR (plus ten 
percent “water losses”).99 After the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, Kyrgyzstan claimed, and sometimes simply appropriated, 
more water for itself.100 Finally, in 2001 the Departments of 
Water Resources in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed that the 
water of the river should be divided equally between them.101 
Similar claims have been made on other rivers and sources, 
with several of them ending in allocation agreements.102 These 
changed allocations that benefit upstream users have left down-
stream users discontent over their reduced water supply.103 It is 
tempting to attribute these conflicts to the inevitable disputes 
arising out of new inter-state borders, however, it is at least as 
valid to suggest that they should be understood as the fallout from 
long-term economic shifts that are occurring in the region, the 
character and final dimensions of which are not yet fully evident.
As a general rule, Uzbek and Tajik groups in the Ferghana 
plains have a much longer history of agricultural production 
and sedentary lifestyles than the Kyrgyz, most of whom prac-
ticed animal husbandry and pursued a nomadic or transhumant 
existence in the foothills and premontane zones.104 However, 
without clear-cut boundaries between them, there were constant 
interactions between these modes of production and lifestyle. 105 
But with the 1924 Soviet national-territorial delimitation, these 
socio-economic distinctions became territorialized.106 They 
served as a basis for establishing the political-administrative 
divisions of the Ferghana Valley in the Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz 
SSRs.107 The borderlines of the Ferghana Valley represented 
not only the territory of newly established Soviet nationalities, 
but to some extent follow the territorial distinction between 
different socio-economic practices such as irrigated agriculture 
and animal husbandry.108
Initially, Soviet regional economic specialization enhanced 
these territorialized socio-economic distinctions. For example, 
specialization fostered irrigated agriculture in the form of cotton 
production in the Uzbek SSR and animal husbandry in the 
form of meat and milk production in the Kyrgyz SSR.109 Later, 
however, Soviet actions undermined specialization. The effort to 
relocate and permanently resettle nomadic populations as well as 
the expansion of irrigated agriculture zones into the foothills had 
precisely this effect.110 With independence, the disintegration of 
the big state farms that produced meat and milk in the Kyrgyz 
sector, and the subsequent privatization of land, led many Kyrgyz 
to turn to private agriculture for their livelihood.111 Today, 
Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks in the foothills practice both animal 
husbandry and agriculture.112 This has had the effect of further 
increasing the demand for both land and water in the foothills of 
the Ferghana Valley.113
This shift in resettlement created new claims for water and 
land in the foothills of the Ferghana Valley, with the competing 
interests drawn along geographic zones, economic classes, 
and ethnic distinctions.114 Thus, conflicts over water and land 
are also driven by territorial claims to the Ferghana Valley.115 
Although the current de facto borderline is unlikely to undergo 
major changes resulting from delimitation, many areas on the 
border are still contested among the three countries.116 Ulti-
mately, the form of land use and the identities of the people using 
a specific section may influence decisions on the borderline.117 
A consequence of national-territorial delimitation is conflicting 
territorial claims among the new countries.118 These tensions 
tend to be especially concentrated in the irrigation systems 
in the foothills.119 While such claims have existed throughout 
the Soviet period, they acquired a new dimension with the 
post-independence nation-building processes. 120 
InTernaTIonal InvolvemenT
Immediately after the Central Asian countries gained their 
independence in 1991, a large number of international aid agen-
cies rushed into the region with projects and funding.121 A prime 
concern of early international engagement was to avoid violent 
conflict among new states over water and to instead seek more 
cooperative modes of engagement.122 A further concern was the 
shrinking of the Aral Sea and its adverse impact on the people 
and the environment.123 With a growing emphasis on agriculture, 
an increased need for irrigation and a wasteful water distribution 
infrastructure caused124 the water levels in the Aral Sea to drop 
between thirteen and eighteen meters since 1960.125 Combined 
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with salinity levels eight times higher than they were in 1960 
and over 400,000 kilometers of land lost to heavy pollution, the 
Aral Sea garnered much attention.126 Efforts were geared toward 
mitigating the disaster as well as protecting the environment for 
the future.127 This meant reducing the draw of water for agriculture 
from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers by rehabilitating 
infrastructure and instituting water-saving irrigation practices.128 
It also meant finding more efficient means of using water, 
including the institution of some sort of pricing mechanism.129 
Finally, international institutions criticized Soviet top-down 
approaches that had reduced farmers—or farm workers, as it 
were—to the status of passive implementers of decisions rather 
than entrusting them with responsibility for their own water 
use.130 Instead, international groups opted for decentralization in 
water management and supported the granting of a high degree 
of self-governance to water users.131
Efforts to rectify the Aral Sea environmental disaster 
led directly to the formulation of inter-state initiatives for 
the improvement of water management in Central Asia as a 
whole.132 The well-publicized disaster generated large funds 
and a multitude of projects from multilateral agencies, bilateral 
donors, and private foundations.133 Spearheading these projects 
from the outset were the World Bank, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (“UNDP”), the European Union (“EU”), 
and the United States Agency for International Development 
(“USAID”).134 To different degrees, each of these organizations 
conducted scientific assessments, produced management plans, 
initiated conservation schemes, and held inter-state negotiations 
to improve the water regulation and ecological condition of the 
Aral Sea.135 
Opinions differ on what all this work and funding actually 
accomplished.136 Several agreements were reached on the 
management of water in the Syr Darya basin and the institu-
tions established to implement them.137 However, the actual 
allocations of water remain hostage to yearly barter agreements 
among the states.138 Moreover, while the ecological condition of 
the Aral Sea region has been improved, it remains unlikely that 
this body of water will ever be restored to its pre-1960s level.139 
Among the many explanations for these outcomes, two warrant 
thorough consideration. One is that nearly all the inter-state 
negotiations sponsored by international agencies focused on the 
nexus of water and energy, but devoted insufficient attention to 
agriculture.140 As a result, parties ignored environmental issues 
in the Syr Darya basin that were caused by water-intensive pro-
duction and other critical agricultural policies.141 Second, many 
of the international funders and agencies were not organized 
enough to assure substantial outcomes, while the local actors 
with whom they interacted lacked commitment to the projects 
and offered only hollow promises.142
Additionally, international involvement with water manage-
ment in Central Asia has focused on promoting reform along 
the lines of Integrated Water Resource Management (“IWRM”), 
usually coupled with the rehabilitation of infrastructure.143 In the 
Ferghana Valley, for example, the Swiss Agency for Develop-
ment and Cooperation has run an IWRM project in cooperation 
with the ICWC since 2001.144 The aim of the project was to 
improve and reorganize the institutional arrangements for water 
management.145 This included the restructuring of water man-
agement on the basis of hydrological rather than administrative 
boundaries, and increasing farmers’ participation in decision-
making.146 The project was joined by an effort towards Canal 
Automation, which would automate the measurement of water 
flows and the transmission of data.147 More generally, interna-
tional funders and organizations have been involved in decen-
tralizing irrigation management along the lines of IWRM have 
established Water User Associations (“WUAs”). Major donor 
organizations promoting this work include the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank in Kyrgyzstan, USAID in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan, and the World Bank in Tajikistan. 148
Irrigation reform based on IWRM principles altered the 
structure of water management in Central Asia. For example, 
International donors have established a large number of WUAs 
and introduced water service fees in Central Asia.149 Consider-
able progress has recently been made to actually collect water 
fees, a process which was initially under-enforced.150 Nonethe-
less, shortcomings remain.151 WUAs usually enjoy little legiti-
macy in the irrigation communities in which they operate, exert 
limited influence on the actual distribution of water compared to 
informal authorities, and are frequently misunderstood as an arm 
of the state instead of representatives of local communities.152 
Yet it remains unclear who is to blame for these shortcomings. 
Dr. Jenniver Sehring, a policy associate at Ecologic Institute, has 
analyzed the irrigation reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
finding that WUAs themselves must bear responsibility for their 
modest impact on the distribution of water.153 Thus, the WUAs’ 
failures stem from their faulty implementation. 
IWRM is a prescriptive concept predicated on the belief that 
democratic governance is good governance.154 IWRM is based 
on a market economy and democratic governance inspired by 
neo-liberal thinking and assumes that the conditions for such 
governance are already in place.155 As a consequence, IWRM 
is “politically blind” to the actual political economy and power 
relations which exist in the Ferghana Valley, especially in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.156 It is questionable whether the 
IWRM goals of economic decentralization, self-government, 
and empowerment of water users can ever be achieved within 
strongly centralized governance systems. 
At present, another major organization in Central Asian 
water relations is the bilateral donor Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (“GIZ”).157 GIZ is commis-
sioned by the German Federal Foreign Office to run the program 
“Transboundary Water Management in Central Asia” during the 
period of 2009-2011, targeting all five countries of the region.158 
The program aims to enhance the expertise and capacity of 
supra-state water management institutions and the International 
Fund for the Aral Sea (“IFAS”).159 An additional focus is on 
the improvement of management by river basin organizations 
situated on selected cross-border rivers.160 GIZ approaches 
these issues with the advisory support of experts, the training of 
personnel, and the creation and facilitation of forums to foster 
29Fall 2011
interdisciplinary and cross-regional exchange.161 GIZ also provides 
funds for technical equipment, refurbishment of irrigation infra-
structure, demonstration facilities, and small hydroelectric plants.162 
PolIcy recommendaTIons
Irrigated agriculture is likely to continue to play a major 
role in Central Asia, particularly in the Ferghana Valley.163 It 
remains the source of people’s livelihoods and the backbone 
of the economies of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and of Kyrgyzstan, 
especially because of the water-energy nexus.164 Desertification 
of the Aral Sea basin remains a critical issue affecting all Cen-
tral Asian countries.165 Although largely a result of poor Soviet 
management, like water diversion schemes, the Aral Sea basin 
remains a major environmental concern and an area of politi-
cal contention.166 In the coming years, the possible restoration 
of infrastructure and the correction of existing flaws remain a 
daunting challenge due to the social and economic concerns.167 
Constructing and maintaining a viable water management 
infrastructure will be a critical step towards mitigating the ten-
sion over water as the expansion of agriculture further forces 
nations to secure their own water needs even at the expense of 
a neighboring country.168 Estimates from scholars Dukhovny 
and Sokolov show the cost of such repairs throughout the Aral 
Sea basin would reach $16 billion.169 Still, this figure does not 
include the cost of applying water-saving technologies or adding 
new hydropower complexes.170 
Identifying sources of such large investments will be a 
major challenge that cannot be borne by the Central Asian states 
alone.171 Moreover, while the updating of irrigation systems is 
seemingly a matter of technical considerations, the physical, 
economic, and legal configuration of such systems are also 
shaped by the character of property rights and user relations.172 
Any effective step towards improving and expanding irrigation 
systems in the Ferghana Valley must address the social and 
political challenges relating to irrigated agriculture. Decisions 
on what form of irrigated agriculture are economically viable, 
environmentally sustainable, and ethically acceptable in the 
Ferghana Valley should be the result of social negotiation. Fur-
thermore, that negotiation requires considering both the existing 
political economies and the needs of people’s livelihoods.
As outlined above, the dilapidated infrastructural heritage 
of the late Soviet period has left huge problems which must be 
addressed. Water is limited in the Ferghana Valley and might 
become even scarcer in the Syr Darya basin over time due to 
climate change and population increase.173 Moreover, these 
concerns are at the same time bound up with state territorializa-
tion and the construction of new collective identities.174 Yet, the 
evidence presented above suggests that the core conflicts over 
land and water do not trace back to any inherent ethnic animosi-
ties, but to the to the economic and social modes that define the 
lives of each group.175 This becomes particularly relevant as the 
ongoing processes of state-building foster new economic and 
moral attachments. Therefore, the decision of the bilateral and 
tripartite border commissions involving Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeki-
stan, and Tajikistan on the final delimitation and demarcation of 
the Ferghana Valley will have a decisive impact on these con-
flicts.176 However, the border commissions have not yet finished 
their work and the process is likely to be slow at best.177 The 
historical changes of these borders and their linkages with the 
spatial layout irrigation infrastructure must be taken into account 
if conflict over water is to be addressed.
International actors have been engaged with water and 
ecological issues in the Ferghana Valley for fifteen years, and 
they are likely to continue such work in the future.178 Large sums 
have been invested, but limited results have been attained.179 
This is partly the result of the normal work constraints of the 
involved international agencies. However, involvement has 
largely taken place within the framework of promoting neo-
liberal reforms leading to market economies and democratic 
politics in the region.180 In the area of water management, the 
IWRM model was promoted both for its own survival and also 
as an indirect means of providing some kind of quid pro quo for 
broader governance reforms.181 This may not always be the most 
productive way to resolve pressing water problems as overly nor-
mative or prescriptive approaches may divert attention from the 
stubborn realities on the ground. It is thus necessary to rethink 
approaches to water management and allow room for alternative 
conceptualizations.
conclusIon
Yearly barter agreements remain the central mechanism 
to determine water and energy transfers between upstream and 
downstream countries.182 Again, it is important to note that they 
do not only result from interstate relations characterized by an 
uncooperative mode, but also from the domestic politics in the 
respective states.183 Currently Kyrgyzstan is still cash-strapped 
and, thus, limited in acquiring energy carriers from abroad.184 
Kyrygyzstan’s inevitable need for heating during cold winters, 
and the government’s inability to provide sufficient electricity, 
is likely to give rise to public discontent and political unrest.185 
Operating the Toktogul reservoir to generate hydropower in win-
tertime, therefore, is an urgent political and economic concern 
of the government of Kyrgyzstan.186 A similar logic applies to 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan interests in the construction of Kam-
bar-Ata and Rogun dams as well as hydropower plants. Beyond 
solving perennial power shortages, both countries also hope 
to export electricity to Central Asia and neighbors and, thus, 
become regional energy suppliers.187
Conversely, political elites in Uzbekistan, and to some extent 
Tajikistan, rely on cotton production in the Ferghana Valley to 
generate income and to support the existing system of social, 
political, and economic control.188 This partly accounts for lead-
ers’ unwillingness to change to less water-intensive crops in the 
Ferghana Valley.189 Furthermore, any related economic change 
may not sustain the existing, cotton reliant systems, which are 
based on exploitation and rent-seeking.190 Thus, the annual ad hoc 
barter agreements on the use of Syr Darya’s water may be less the 
result of inter-state cooperation and more the result of the conflict-
ing political interests of domestic actors within each country. 
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Addressing the challenges in Central Asia requires the reas-
sessment of domestic and regional policies, including improve-
ment to the water management infrastructure of the Aral Sea 
basin. Additionally, any improvements to, or expansion of, the 
irrigation systems in the Ferghana Valley must first consider the 
social and political challenges relating to irrigated agriculture. 
International actors need to consider alternative approaches to 
water management outside of the prevailing neo-liberal reforms. 
Only by assessing the spatial layout of watercourses and irriga-
tion infrastructure can resource management effectively avert 
conflicts over water and land in Central Asia. 
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